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Abstract
ALGORITHMIC PROPERTIES OF POLY-Z GROUPS AND
SECRET SHARING USING NON-COMMUTATIVE GROUPS
By: BREN CAVALLO
Advisor: Delaram Kahrobaei
Computational aspects of polycyclic groups have been used to
study cryptography since 2004 when Eick and Kahrobaei [21] pro-
posed polycyclic groups as a platform for conjugacy based crypto-
graphic protocols.
In the first chapter we study the conjugacy problem in poly-
cyclic groups and construct a family of torsion-free polycyclic groups
where the uniform conjugacy problem over the entire family is at
least as hard as the subset sum problem. We further show that the
conjugacy problem in these groups is in NP, implying that the uni-
form conjugacy problem is NP-complete over these groups. This is
joint work with Delaram Kahrobaei from [13]. We also present an
algorithm for the conjugacy problem in groups of the form ZnoφZ
that can be seen in [14].
We continue by studying automorphisms of poly-Z groups and
successive cyclic extensions of arbitrary groups. We study a cer-
tain kind of extension that we call “deranged”, and show that the
automorphisms of the resulting group have a strict form. We also
show that the automorphism group of a group obtained by iter-
ated extensions of this type contains a non-abelian free group if
and only if the original base group does. Finally we show that it is
possible to verify that a finitely presented by infinite cyclic group
v
is finitely presented by infinite cyclic, but that determining that
a general finitely presented group is finitely generated by infinite
cyclic is undecidable. We then discuss implications the latter re-
sult has for calculating the Bieri-Neumann-Strebel invariant (see
[5]). This is joint work with Jordi Delgado, Delaram Kahrobaei,
Ha Lam, and Enric Ventura and is currently in preparation [12].
In the final chapter we discuss secret sharing schemes and vari-
ations. We begin with classical secret sharing schemes and present
variations that allow them to be more practical. We then present
a secret sharing scheme due to Habeeb, Kahrobaei, and Shpilrain
[30]. Finally, we present an original adjustment to their scheme
that involves the shortlex order on a group and allows less informa-
tion to be transmitted each time a secret is shared. Additionally,
we propose additional steps that allow participants to update their
information independently so that the scheme remains secure over
multiple rounds. This is joint work with Delaram Kahrobaei from
[15].
Preface
The use of non-commutative group theory in cryptography is a
recent development. Its root can perhaps be traced to the work of
Magyarik and Wagner in 1985 [64], but the theory became more
widespread after Anshel, Anshel, and Goldfed introduced their
key exhange protocol in 1999 [1]. See [51] for an in-depth overview
on non-commutative group based cryptography. Computational
aspects of polycyclic groups have been used to study cryptogra-
phy since 2004 when Eick and Kahrobaei [21] proposed polycyclic
groups as a platform for conjugacy based cryptographic protocols.
As such, the study of algorithmic properties of infinite polycyclic
groups, particularly evaluating the computational complexity of
algorithms, is becoming more relevant.
We start in Chapter 1 where we investigate the conjugacy
problem in polycyclic groups. We begin by introducing key ele-
ments of the theory of polycyclic groups that will be used in this
thesis along with a brief introduction to NP-completeness and the
subset sum problem. We proceed by introducing and constructing
a family of groups whose conjugacy problem is at least as hard
as a variation on the subset sum problem that we call the twisted
subset sum problem. We then study conjugacy further and show
vi
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that these groups have the property that conjugacy can be per-
formed and checked quickly while viewing elements as exponent
vectors. Finally, we prove that the twisted subset sum problem is
NP-complete, implying that the conjugacy problem over the fam-
ily of groups we construct is NP-complete. This is joint work with
Delaram Kahrobaei from [13] published in the International Jour-
nal of Algebra and Computation. Finally we discuss a polynomial
time solution to the conjugacy problem in free abelian by infinite
cyclic groups from [14] published in the Reports @ SCM.
In Chapter 2 we focus more on infinite cyclic extensions of
groups and prove structural results about their automorphism groups.
Following [8] we define a certain type of automorphism such that
extending by it leaves the base group fixed. This leads to explicit
forms for the automorphisms of said extensions. We further show
that such extensions extend groups in an essentially unique way
and show that the presence of non abelian free groups in the au-
tomorphism group of iterated extensions is determined solely by
the automorphism group of the base group. We then discuss an
algorithm that verifies that a group is finitely presented by infinite
cyclic but show that membership in the class of such groups is
undecidable. We then review the Bieri-Neumann-Strebel invariant
and show implications of its calculation based on the previous re-
sults. This is joint work with Jordi Delgado, Delaram Kahrobaei,
Ha Lam, and Enric Ventura and is currently in preparation [12].
In Chapter 3 we discuss secret sharing using non-commutative
groups. We begin with an introduction to classical secret sharing
and provide a formal definition of a secret sharing scheme. Next,
viii
we present classical secret sharing schemes due to Blakley [6] and
Shamir [60] and verifiable variations due to Feldman [24] and Ped-
ersen [53]. We also present a proactive secret sharing scheme due
to Herzberg et. al. [32]. Afterwards, we introduce a secret sharing
scheme due to Habeeb, Kahrobaei, and Shpilrain [30] and intro-
duce the platform group, namely small cancellation groups. Fi-
nally, we present joint work with Delaram Kahrobaei from [15]
appearing in Contemporary Mathematics, that is a modification
of the Habeeb-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain secret sharing scheme, that is
more efficient. We also add additional steps, so that information
sent at the beginning of the process is secure after multiple secrets
are shared.
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Chapter 1
The Conjugacy Problem in
Poly-Z Groups
1.1 Introduction
Given a finite presentation representing a group G, the conjugacy
decision problem for G takes as input words u and v in the gen-
erators of G and asks if there exists x in the generators of G such
that xux−1 represents the same element in G as v. For the pur-
poses of cryptography, we often consider the search variant: given
conjugate u, v ∈ G, find x ∈ G that conjugates u to v. The
first instance of the conjugacy search problem in cryptography ap-
peared in the seminal paper of Anshel, Anshel, and Goldfeld [1]
in which the authors introduced a key exchange protocol where
the security is largely based on the conjugacy search problem.
Since then the conjugacy search problem has become a central
1
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part of non-commutative group based cryptography. Other cryp-
tographic protocols that rely on conjugacy search problem include
[35, 36, 37, 43].
Polycyclic groups were originally proposed as a platform group
for AAG by Eick and Kahrobaei in [21]. Since then Garber,
Kahrobaei, and Lam [27] offered computational evidence that in-
dicates that a common heuristic attack against AAG, the length
based attack, was not effective on polycyclic groups. It is worth
also mentioning that the length based attack was effective in break-
ing AAG over braid groups (see [28, 49]) which were the proposed
platform for AAG from [1].
In this chapter we introduce a family of polycyclic groups over
which the uniform conjugacy decision and search problems are
NP-complete. What we mean by this, is that there is a family of
polycyclic groups, Gn, where Gn has Hirsch length 2n+ 1 and the
conjugacy decision and search problems are NP-complete as we
vary the word length and n. As such, a polynomial time algorithm
that solves either conjugacy problem in these groups would imply
P = NP. This is joint work with Delaram Kahrobaei from [13].
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The chapter begins by discussing polycyclic groups and in par-
ticular poly-Z groups. We then define the complexity class NP,
the notion of NP-completeness and the theory of one of the most
famous NP-complete problems, the Subset Sum Problem. We
continue by explicitly constructing the groups Gn and show that
the uniform conjugacy decision problem over these groups is NP-
complete. This involves showing that instances of the conjugacy
problem are at least as hard as the Subset Sum Problem and that
the conjugacy problem is in NP. We finish by studying the con-
jugacy problem in groups of the form Zn oM Z and introduce a
practical algorithm for both the conjugacy decision and search
problems. The theorems and proofs and much of the style of ex-
position for the first nine sections is drawn from [13], whereas the
theorems and proofs for 1.10 is drawn from [14].
It is often the case that a solution to the conjugacy decision
problem often provides a solution to the search problem. As such,
for the remainder of this dissertation, when we refer to the conju-
gacy problem, we often mean solving both problems if the context
is not clear.
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1.2 The Complexity of Conjugacy Problem in
Polycyclic Groups
Before we present the main results of this chapter, we begin with
a brief introduction as to what is known about the conjugacy deci-
sion and search problems in polycyclic groups. We first note that
the conjugacy problem for finitely presented groups is in general
undecidable. See [16] in which the authors construct a finitely
presented group with undecidable conjugacy problem which con-
tains an index two subgroup with solvable conjugacy problem. On
the other hand, the conjugacy search problem, given conjugate
u, v ∈ G find x ∈ G that conjugates u to v, can be solved in any
recursively presented group for any inputs (see page 12 from [51]).
Polycyclic groups were shown to have solvable conjugacy deci-
sion problem independently by Formanek [25] and Remeslennikov
[54]. More precisely, they showed that any virtually polycyclic
group is conjugacy separable- if u, v ∈ G are not conjugate, then
there exists a finite homomorphic image in which the images of
u and v are not conjugate. While their results show decidability,
their papers do not provide an algorithm that is amenable to a
complexity analysis. Moreover, the algorithm involves brute force
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computation, so it can be seen that it is inefficient in a worst case
scenario.
The first practical algorithm for deciding conjugacy decision
and search in polycyclic groups was given by Eick and Ostheimer
(see [19, 22]). It was noted in [21] that the algorithm of Eick
and Ostheimer likely has a high worst case complexity since it
may involve computation of the unit group of an algebraic number
field. Additionally, in [21], Eick and Kahrobaei demonstrated that
the algorithm applied to conjugacy search takes large amounts of
time even over groups of relatively low Hirsch length.
Andrew Sale in [55, 56] studied the geometry of conjugacy in
polycyclic groups by studying their conjugacy length function:
CLFG(n) = max{min{|w| : wu = vw} :
|u|+ |v| ≤ n, u and v are conjugate inG}
The polycyclic groups Sale studied were ones of the form ZnoφZm
where certain technical conditions were imposed on φ. He showed
that when m = 1 the conjugacy length function is bounded from
above by a linear function and for m > 1 that it is bounded from
above by an exponential function. Due to the exponential growth
6
of these groups, this implies that there is a exponential algorithm
to solve both variants of the conjugacy problem in the case that
m = 1 and doubly exponential when m > 1.
Altogether, much is still unknown about the complexity of the
conjugacy decision and search problems over a general polycyclic
group. In [21] and [27] the authors conjecture that the conju-
gacy problem is exponential over the family of polycyclic groups
as the Hirsch length increases. In the remainder of this chapter,
we provide evidence for their view by showing that if an algorithm
for conjugacy that varies polynomially with respect to the Hirsch
length exists, then P = NP. It is still unknown if there exists a
polynomial time algorithm that solves conjugacy in a single gen-
eral polycyclic group.
1.3 Polycyclic Groups
In this section we will give an overview of many of the basic prop-
erties polycyclic groups and split extensions. Many of these results
and their proofs can be found in [18, 19].
Definition 1.3.1. A group G is polycyclic if it has a subnormal se-
ries with cyclic quotients. Namely, G has subgroups G0, G1, · · · , Gn
7
such that
{1} = G0 / G1 / · · · / Gn = G
and Gi+1/Gi is a cyclic group.
1.3.1 Normal Forms
Lemma 1.3.2. Given a polycyclic group G with subnormal series
{1} = G0/G1/· · ·/Gn = G, there exist elements g1, g2, · · · , gn ∈ G
such that for any word w ∈ G, w = ge11 g
e2
2 · · · genn for some ei ∈ Z.
Proof. Let ḡi generate the quotient Gi/Gi−1 and let gi denote a
fixed pre-image of ḡi in Gi. Given any word w ∈ G, w is equal
to wn−1g
en
n for some wn−1 ∈ Gn−1 and en ∈ Z. In fact, the im-
age of w in the quotient Gn/Gn−1 is ḡ
en
n . We continue by then
writing wn−1 = wn−2g
en−1





n . Iterating this computation down the subnor-
mal series, we eventually end with a prefix w1 ∈ G1, but since
G1 is cyclic with generator g1, we can write w1 = g
e1
1 . Therefore
w = ge11 g
e2
2 · · · genn .
We call such a representative of an element of G, its normal
form. Notice that the choice of the gi is not necessarily unique.
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In addition to multiple choices of pre-images existing, a subnor-
mal series with cyclic quotients is also not in general unique. For a
polycyclic group G, we fix a subnormal series that we call the poly-
cyclic series and fix a corresponding set of generators, {g1, · · · , gn},
which we call its polycyclic generating set. We also call the process
of converting a general word into its normal form representative,
collection.
1.3.2 Semi-direct Products
Given groups, N and K, and a homomorphism φ : K → Aut(N)
we can define the semi-direct product, N oφK. As a set, N oφK,
is equal to N ×K, but the group structure is:
(n1, k1)(n2, k2) = (n1φ(k1)(n2), k1k2).
The multiplication in the first and second coordinates are multi-
plication in N and K respectively. As such, it can be seen that if φ
sends every element of K to the identity on N , then the semi-direct
product is the direct product.
If we let N = 〈n1, · · · , nl|R〉 and K = 〈k1, · · · kp|Q〉, then we
can present N oφ K as
9
〈n1, · · · , nl, k1 · · · , kp|R,Q, kjnik−1j = φ(kj)(ni)〉
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l and 1 ≤ j ≤ p.
Finally, if we let G ' NoφK, then G/N ' K. This can be seen
by noting that N is normal and inspecting the above presentation.
1.3.3 Poly-Z Groups
Of specific interest to us in this chapter are polycyclic groups where
each quotient Gi/Gi−1 ' Z. We call such groups poly-Z. To aid
us with the study of these groups we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1.3.3. Let H / G such that G/H ' Z. Also let t be the
pre-image of generator for Z. Then G ' HoφZ where φ(tk)(h) =
tkht−k.
Proof. First note that since H is normal in G, conjugation by t
restricted to H is in Aut(H). As such, φ is well-defined.
Since G/H = Z, we can write each element in G uniquely as
htk for some h ∈ H and k ∈ Z. Our isomorphism ψ : G→ H oφZ
is given by
10
ψ(htk) = (h, tk).
First, let us prove this map is a homomorphism.
ψ(h1t
k1)ψ(h2t




















Therefore the map is a homomorphism. Injectivity and surjec-
tivity follow from inspecting the map.
This lemma shows that poly-Z groups are created by successive
infinite cyclic extensions. If G is a poly-Z group with polycyclic
sequence {1} = G0 / G1 / · · · / Gn = G, then G ' Gn−1oφn−1 Z for
some φn−1 ∈ Aut(Gn−1). Proceeding iteratively, we see that
G ' ((· · · ((Z oφ1 Z)oφ2 Z)oφ3 · · · )oφn−2 Z)oφn−1 Z
where φi ∈ Aut(Gi).
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If we choose gi as the generator of the i
th Z in the above iterated
semi-direct product, we can make a presentation using the explicit
description of a semi-direct product presentation above:
G = 〈g1, g2, · · · , gn|gjgig−1j = φj−1(gi)〉 for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n
The relations in this presentation indicate a simple collection
algorithm for G. Start with the highest indexed generator, gn,
and apply the relation gngi = φn−1(gi)gn until all of the gn’s have
accumulated at the right end of the word. Notice that we are left
with a word of the form wgkn where w contains no gn’s. This is
because φn−1(gi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 contains no gn, since φn−1 ∈
Aut(Gn−1). We then repeat the same process with gn−1 moving
each gn−1 to the right using the identity gn−1gi = φn−2(gi)gn−1 until
we have accumulated all of them immediately to the left of the gkn
we accumulated in the previous step. We then repeat the same
process moving down in index until our word is in normal form.
Moreover, if we want to multiply words in G and then collect, we
simply concatenate the words, reduce, and then start this process.
While this method is guaranteed to terminate, it is not the most
practical. See [29] and [45] for other collection methods.
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We also define the Hirsch length as the number of Z’s in the
semi-direct product formulation of the poly-Z group. The Hirsch
length is an isomorphism invariant, so while different automor-
phisms in the construction of the poly-Z group may lead to iso-
morphic groups, the number of factors is necessarily the same.
For a given word w = gk11 · · · gknn we define the length of w to
be:
|w| = nK
where K = max1≤i≤n{log(|ki|)}. As such, we consider the number
of digits it takes to represent each exponent rather than the size
of the exponent itself. This can be viewed the bitwise length of
the unique exponent vector: [k1, · · · , kn]. It is worth noting that
this is different than the standard geodesic length in a group that
is often used to measure algorithmic complexity. We find that this
measure is useful in our case, since most practical applications,
such as cryptography, use elements in normal form. We then take
the length of a conjugacy problem to be sum of the lengths of its
inputs.
13
1.4 NP - Completeness
We start this section with the formal definition of a decision prob-
lem.
Definition 1.4.1. A decision problem is a pair (L, I) where I is
the set of inputs to the decision problem, and L is the subset of I
where the decision problem evaluates to “true”
We call the set L a language. In this framework, the decision
problem can be interpreted as checking if for some x ∈ I, that x ∈
L. In this way a decision problem is undecidable if the membership
problem for L is undecidable.
Example: Consider the conjugacy problem in a poly-Z group, G.
If we say that G has Hirsch length n, we can take I = Zn × Zn
where we interpret Zn as the set of exponent vectors for G. Then,
(x, y) ∈ I is in L, if there exists a ∈ G such that agxa−1 = gy,
where gx and gy are the group elements corresponding to x and y
in G.
After fixing a set of inputs, any decision problem can be com-
pletely interpreted as the set of strings for which the problem is
satisfied. As such, it is customary to set I = {0, 1}∗, the set of
14
strings made up of 0’s and 1’s of arbitrary length. By fixing a
set of inputs, we can then talk about languages and corresponding
decision problems interchangeably.
Definition 1.4.2. A language, L, is said to be in NP if there ex-
ists an integer valued polynomial p, and a polynomial time Turing
Machine, M , such that for all x ∈ I, x ∈ L if and only if there
exists a string u such that |u| ≤ p(|x|) and M(x, u) = 1.
This definition can be interpreted to mean that a language is
in NP if there are short “yes” answers that can be verified quickly.
Such a u is called a certificate.
A central question in theoretical computer science, is whether
or not any problem in NP can be answered with a polynomial time
Turing machine. This is called the P versus NP problem.
NP admits a certain hierarchy under polynomial time reduc-
tions.
Definition 1.4.3. A decision problem, Q, can be reduced to a de-
cision problem, R, in polynomial time if there exists a polynomial
time mapping, f , from inputs of Q to inputs of R, such that an
input x is a “yes” instance of Q if and only if f(x) is a “yes”
15
instance of R. Such a mapping must also increase the lengths of
instances at most polynomially. We write Q ≤p R to say that Q
polynomial time reduces to R.
It follows from the definition, that if A ≤p B, that a polynomial
time algorithm for B can be additionally used to solve A in poly-
nomial time. One can also see that polynomial time reductions are
transitive: A ≤p B and B ≤p C imply A ≤p C.
Definition 1.4.4. A decision problem, B, is NP-complete if B ∈
NP and for all A ∈ NP, A ≤p B.
NP-complete problems can be thought of as the most difficult
problems in NP since an algorithm that solves one can be used to
solve any other problem in NP. Moreover, if there exists a poly-
nomial time Turing machine that solves an NP-complete problem,
then P = NP. The notion of NP-completeness was independently
discovered by Stephen Cook and Leonid Levin in 1971 when they
showed that the Boolean Satisfiability problem was NP-complete.
In 1972, Richard Karp made a list of 21 NP-complete problems
[40], showing that the notion of NP-completeness could be seen in
problems having to do with integer linear programming and graph
theory.
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1.5 Subset Sum Problem
The Subset Sum Problem, or SSP , is the following: given a set
of integers, L = {k1, k2, · · · , kn}, and an integer, M , determine
if there exists a subset of L that sums to M . This can also be
rephrased as determining if there is a solution to the equation:
k1x1 + · · ·+ knxn = M where xi ∈ {0, 1}.
The size of a subset sum problem is given by:
|SSP (L,M)| = nK
where |L| = n and K is the maximal number of bits needed to
represent any element of L or M . As such, this can be thought
of as the minimal number of bits needed to represent the list and
target for the subset sum problem. The SSP is well known to be
NP-complete [40] as we vary n and K.
It is important that we view the lengths of the coefficients in
binary. If we instead view the size of the coefficients to be their
absolute values, there is a polynomial time solution utilizing dy-
namic programming (see [42]). Such a form for the coefficients
is called unary. This is due to the fact that coefficients are not
17
represented as strings of ones and zeros, but rather as strings of
just one symbol where the length of the string corresponds to the
coefficient. We provide a similar dynamic programming algorithm
applied to a variation of the SSP in Section 1.6.
So far we have only referred to the decision variant of the SSP
rather than its search variant: given that we have a subset with
the desired sum, find such a subset. While NP-completeness only
exists for decision problems, we can show that a polynomial time
algorithm for a search variant of the SSP would imply that there
is a polynomial time algorithm for the decision problem. As such,
for much of this chapter, we slightly abuse concepts by referring to
the NP-completeness of the SSP search problem. In the remainder
of this section, we sketch a proof that a polynomial time algorithm
for the SSP search problem implies existence of a polynomial time
algorithm for the SSP .
If there is a polynomial time Turing machine, M , solving the
SSP search problem, there then exists a polynomial P (n) such
that for any input x, the number of steps M takes on input x is less
than or equal to P (|x|). We create another Turing machine, M ′,
18
that on input y performs the same steps as M for at most P (|y|)
steps. If M ′ halts and produces a subset before P (|y|) steps, then
M ′ outputs “yes”. If M ′ has not yet finished, it instead outputs
“no” since if there were a positive answer it would have found it
already. As such, a polynomial time algorithm for the SSP search
problem would imply a polynomial time algorithm for the decision
variant.
1.6 The Twisted Subset Sum Problem
Given a list L = {k1, · · · , kn} and an integer M , the Twisted Sub-
set Sum Problem (TSSP ) is determining if the following equation
has a solution:
knxn(−1)x1+x2+···xn−1+
kn−1xn−1(−1)x1+x2+···+xn−2 + · · ·+ k2x2(−1)x1 + k1x1 = M
where xi ∈ {0, 1}. Note that we could trivially let xi be any
number and replace xi with xi mod 2 in the above equation. For
the remainder of this chapter, we write x′i = xi mod 2. We also
take
|TSSP (L,M)| = nK
where n and K are the same parameters is used in the determining
the length of the SSP .
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We now now provide a dynamic programming algorithm from
[13] for the TSSP which operates in polynomial time when the
coefficients are taken in unary. We will proceed in a similar fashion
to the standard dynamic programming algorithm for the subset
sum problem, but due to the additional complexity of the TSSP ,
each entry in the array we create will either be a list of pairs of
the form (T, ε) where ε = {0, 1} (T corresponds to the boolean
“True”) or will solely contain F (corresponding to the boolean
“False”) . The boolean entry in each tuple allows us to know if
the corresponding target can be attained by the corresponding sub-
list while the integer entry refers the parity of the number items
we are including from the list to attain the target. If the entry in
the array solely contains F , then such a target cannot be reached
by the corresponding sub-list.
1. Allocate an empty two dimensional array, A, where the rows are
labeled 1 through n and the columns are labeled −S through S
where S = |k1|+ · · ·+ |kn|.
2. Set A(1, j) := (T, 1) if j = k1, otherwise, set A(1, j) to F . The
1 indicates that the next item will be subtracted. In the future
we may also see (T, 0) to indicate that the next item will be
20
added. This corresponds to the sum of the xi modulo 2.
3. For each A(i, j) where i > 1 do the following (we do this recur-
sively so we compute row 2 before row 3):
i. If ki = j add a (T, 1) into the list A(i, j).
ii. If (T, ε) ∈ A(i − 1, j) where ε ∈ {−1, 1}, then add a (T, ε)
into A(i, j). As such, A(i− 1, j) ⊂ A(i, j).
iii. If (T, 0) ∈ A(i− 1, j − ki) add (T, 1) to A(i, j).
iv. If (T, 1) ∈ A(i− 1, j + ki) add (T, 0) to A(i, j).
v. Otherwise set A(i, j) equal to F .
To solve TSSP ({k1, · · · , kn},M) , we fill the array and check
if A(n,M) contains either (T, 0) or (T, 1). Filling each box in
the array takes polynomially many steps since the algorithm has
already filled in all the boxes in the row below it and since filling
in the first row is trivial. On the other hand, this algorithm is
exponential time when the coefficients are taken in binary since
the number of columns would be exponential in size with respect
to the coefficients. We later show (Section 1.9) that the TSSP
is NP-complete when the coefficients are taken in binary.
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1.7 The conjugacy problem over the groups Gn
We construct the group Gn as iterated extensions by Z as follows:









g1gj if j = 2i
gj otherwise
Multiplication in G is defined by the following identities: if j
is even, gjg1 = g
−1
1 gj , gj+1gj = g1gjgj+1, and all other generators
commute. In this section, we will show that any instance of the
TSSP with n indeterminates can be viewed as an instance of con-
jugacy in Gn. It can additionally be seen that this is a polynomial
time reduction due to the definition of lengths of instances given
in Section 1.3 and Section 1.5.
The following lemma from [13], is a consequence of these mul-
tiplicative identities and will be used in the proofs of Theorem
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1.7.2 and Proposition 1.8.1 .
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j . For the second identity, we





bgj+1. Now note that (g1gj)
2 = g1gjg1gj = g1g
−1
1 gjgj = g
2
j
from the first part of the lemma. Therefore if b = 2l is even, then
(g1gj)
b = ((g1gj)
2)l = (g2j )







































We now show that TSSP ({k1, k2 · · · , kn},M), has a solution
if and only if gk13 g
k2
5 · · · g
kn




5 · · · g
kn
2n+1. Our general
strategy will be as follows: conjugate gk13 g
k2
5 · · · g
kn
2n+1 by a generic
word inGn and and compute the normal form of the resulting word.
First, note that from the multiplication rules above, it can be seen
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5 · · · g
kn
2n+1. It can
also be seen from the lemma that conjugating by one of the gener-
ators with even index does not introduce any generators with even
index in the collected word. Therefore, without loss of generality,
we can assume that our generic word is of the form gx12 g
x2
4 · · · g
xn
2n
because adding in any generators with odd index doesn’t affect the
conjugated product.
Before we continue, we introduce the notation:
p(k1, · · · , kn, x1, x2, · · · , xn) =
knx
′




Theorem 1.7.2. The TSSP with n indeterminates is polynomial
time reducible to the conjugacy problem in the group Gn of Hirsch
length 2n+ 1.
Proof. Our overall strategy in the proof is to collect gk13 g
k2
5 · · · g
kn
2n+1
conjugated by an arbitrary word in Gn, and show that we end up
with −p(k1, · · · , kn, x1, x2, · · · , xn) as the exponent above g1.
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We proceed by induction on l where we conjugate by the last l
syllables of the generic word. Rather than starting with l = 1 it
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kn
2n+1











































































We now induct and assume the result holds for l = n − 1 and
show it holds for l = n . In this case we have:
(gx12 g
x2



































































3 · · · g
kn
2n+1
Finally, note that TSSP ({k1, · · · , kn},−M) has a solution if
and only if gk13 g
k2
5 · · · g
kn




5 · · · g
kn
2n+1. As we noted at
the beginning of the chapter, this reduction from TSSP with n
indeterminates to this instance of conjugacy in Gn is polynomial
since the lengths of problems are only off by a linear polynomial.
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It is worth noting, that here is where our measure of length of
group elements is crucial. If we had the length of elements in G be
measured as |k1| + · · · + |kn|, then the conjugacy problem would
be exponentially larger than an instance of TSSP and we would
not have a polynomial time reduction. Also, as we pointed out
in Section 1.6, the TSSP has a polynomial time solution using
dynamic programming when the elements in the list are taken in
unary. This would imply that the instance of the conjugacy prob-
lem discussed in Theorem 1.7.2 with the more standard measure
of length of elements in normal form would have a polynomial time
solution using the algorithm introduced in Section 1.6.
1.8 The Conjugacy Problem In Gn Is In NP
In this section we show that the conjugacy problem in the groups
Gn can be verified in polynomial time. To do this we will find
closed form expressions for conjugating a word by a power of a
single generator. These closed form expressions will be effectively
computable with group elements in their normal form and take
polynomially many steps with respect to the length defined in Sec-
tion 1.3. Since conjugation can be done by iteratively conjugating
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by powers of single generators, these closed forms show that con-
jugacy can be verified efficiently. What follows is the computation
of the closed forms from [13].
When conjugating elements in Gn there are three cases to con-
sider: conjugation by powers g1, conjugation by powers of gj with
j even, and conjugation by powers of gl where l is odd and larger
than 1.
For the first case we collect
gk1(g
k1





In this case, to collect the above word, we must bring the g−k1 at
the right end of the word all the way to the left. This can be done
using the identities gjg1 = g
−1
1 gj for j even and glg1 = g1gl for l
odd. The first identity states that when we move the g−k1 to the
left we switch the sign of the exponent according to the parity of
the exponents of the even indexed gj. The second identity states
that the odd gl commute with g1, and do not affect the collection






2 · · · g
k2n+1
2n+1 (1.1)
The second case is then collecting
gkj (g
k1





where j is even.
We first move the gkj right. Hopping over the g
k1
1 may change
the sign of the exponent, but after that, each gi commutes with gj





2 · · · g
k+kj





In moving the g−kj to the left, the only thing that doesn’t com-
mute is gj+1. To hop over g
kj+1




























j+1 ) · · · g
k2n+1
2n+1
Finally, we move the g
kj+1k
′










j+1 · · · g
k2n+1
2n+1 (1.2)













l · · · g
k2n+1
2n+1 =


















2 · · · g
k2n+1
2n+1 (1.3)
Since conjugation is done by successively conjugating elements
of the form of those in (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3) these closed forms can
iteratively perform a general conjugation. Such a computation can
be performed in polynomial time in terms of nK because comput-
ing the normal form after conjugation by each syllable can be done
in polynomial time using the closed forms, and need only be per-
formed 2n+ 1 times. This means that we can create a polynomial
time verifier for the conjugacy problem in the Gn.
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These normal forms also provide us with the following corollar-
ies that describe conjugation in the group. The proofs for both
statements can be seen directly be inspecting the closed forms
above.
Proposition 1.8.1. Let u, v ∈ Gn where u = ge11 · · · g
e2n+1
2n+1 and
v = gf11 · · · g
f2n+1
2n+1 .
i. u ∼ v implies ei = fi for i ≥ 2.
ii. Let ei = fi for i ≥ 2. If there exists an even l − 1 such that
el−1 = fl−1 is odd, the u and v are conjugate. In fact, one such




Note that part ii of the above corollary does not include the
difficult cases of the conjugacy problem that we saw in Section
1.7.
We now show that for any two conjugate elements, u, v ∈ Gn,
there exists a conjugator whose length is bounded polynomially
by the lengths of u and v. Let u = ge11 g
e2
2 · · · g
e2n+1
2n+1 and v =
gf11 g
e2
2 · · · g
e2n+1
2n+1 and w = g
x1
1 · · · g
x2n+1
2n+1 such that wuw
−1 = v. In
the case that there exists an odd exponent above an even indexed
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generator, we have a certificate of polynomial length from part ii
of Corollary 1.8.1. Therefore, we can assume that for all j even,
ej is even.
If we assume that for all j even, ej is even, we have from the
closed form (1.3) that there exists a conjugator where xl = 0 for all
l > 1 odd. Additionally, we can take xj to be 0 or 1 for j even by
looking at the closed forms from (1.2). It remains to put bounds
on x1.
Let y be the exponent above g1 conjugating by g
x2
2 · · · g
x2n+1
2n+1 .
Then by repeated applications of (1.2), |y| ≤ |e1|+|e3|+· · ·+|e2n+1|.
From (1.1), conjugating by gx11 either increases the exponent by 2x1
or leaves it unchanged. Therefore if f1 = y, we can take x1 to be
0 and then clearly a certificate has length O(n). Otherwise, f1 =
y+2x1 implying that |x1| ≤ |f1|+|y| ≤ |f1|+|e1|+|e3|+· · ·+|e2n+1|.
This means that the length of a certificate is bounded from above
by log(|f1|+ |e1|+ |e3|+ · · ·+ |e2n+1|)+n which is of polynomial size
in the length of the original conjugacy problem. This now shows
that the conjugacy problem in Gn is in NP.
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1.9 The Reduction of SSP to TSSP
In this section we show that SSP ≤p TSSP . To make this easier
we introduce another problem SSP ′ that is similar to SSP and
in fact show that SSP ≤p SSP ′ ≤p TSSP . We define SSP ′ as
follows: given a list of integers {k1, · · · , kn} and an integer M ,
decide if there exists a solution to the equation:
k1x1 + · · · knxn = M where x1, · · · , xn ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
In this section, the proofs and theorems are taken from [13].
Lemma 1.9.1. SSP ′ ≤p TSSP .
Proof. Consider SSP ′({k1, · · · , kn},M) and TSSP ({0, k1, 0, k2, · · ·
, 0, kn},M), instances of SSP ′ and TSSP respectively. In this
case, we have that if (x1, x2, · · · , xn) is a solution for SSP ′({k1, · · · ,
kn},M) then (y1, y2, · · · , y2n) is a solution for the corresponding
TSSP problem where y2i = |xi| and y2i−1 = 1 if:
xi = −1 and y1 + · · ·+ y2i−2 is even (−ki appears in the sum)
or
xi = 1 and y1 + · · ·+ y2i−2 is odd (ki appears in the sum)
and is 0 otherwise.
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We now show that SSP ≤p SSP ′ by adapting a proof from the
appendix of [42] by Kellerer, Pferschy, and Pisinger. Consider the
following systems of equations:

∑n
i=1 kixi = M




i=1 kixi = M
xi + yi = 1 for i = 1, · · · , n









nM + 4n − 1
xi, yi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
(1.6)
First, note that (1.4) and (1.5) have equivalent solutions: any
set of xi that satisfies one will satisfy the other. The constraints
xi + yi = 1 and xi, yi ∈ {−1, 0, 1} prevent xi from ever being −1.
What is less apparent is that (1.5) and (1.6) have the same solution
set. If this is the case, we can solve any instance of SSP , (1.4),
using an algorithm that solves the equivalent SSP ′ (1.6). If we
also show that the size of (1.6) is only polynomially larger than
(1.4) then we will have in fact shown that SSP ≤p SSP ′, thus
proving that both SSP ′ and TSSP are NP-complete.
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Proposition 1.9.2. The following systems of equations have the
same set of solutions:
∑n
i=1 kixi = M
x1 + y1 = 1
xi, yi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
(1.7)

x1 + y1 + 4
∑n
i=1 kixi = 4M + 1
xi, yi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
(1.8)
Proof. First note that anything that is a solution to (1.7) is a so-
lution to (1.8). In the other direction, assume that (x1, · · · , xn, y1)




kixi −M) = 1− x1 − y1 (1.9)




kixi −M) ≤ 3 (1.10)
Finally, since
∑n
i=1 kixi−M is an integer, (1.10) can only be sat-
isfied if
∑n
i=1 kixi−M = 0 implying that (x1, · · · , xn) is a solution
for (1.7).
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Proposition 1.9.3. The systems of equations (1.5) and (1.6) have
the same set of solutions.
Proof. As we did in the previous proposition, we combine the con-
ditions xi + yi = 1 to the equation
∑n
i=1 kixi = M to obtain an
instance of SSP ′ whose solution will yield a solution to the corre-
sponding instance of the SSP .
We then continue as in the proposition, merging our system of
equations into just one, by performing the same steps beginning
with x1 + y1 = 1 and ending with xn + yn = 1. Note, that as we
perform each step, we are not changing the solution set. After we
have performed the first two steps we have the equation:




kixi = 4(4M + 1) + 1











nM + 4n−1 + 4n−2 + · · ·+ 1
After collecting like terms on the left and summing the geomet-
ric series on the right we have (1.6).
Theorem 1.9.4. SSP ≤p SSP ′ ≤p TSSP implying that the
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TSSP is NP-complete as is the uniform conjugacy decision prob-
lem over the Gn.
Proof. All that is left to show is that the process described in this
section turns instances of SSP , (1.4) into instances of TSSP , (1.6)
in polynomial time and that the size of the TSSP instance is only
polynomially larger than the SSP instance. First notice that (1.6)
has 2n indeterminates and since each of the 4i can be expressed
in 2n bits, the number of digits needed to express each coefficient
increases polynomially. As such, (1.6) is polynomially larger than
(1.4). Additionally, the new coefficients can clearly be computed
in polynomial time.
Furthermore, from the argument in Section 1.5, a polynomial
time algorithm for the conjugacy search problem over the Gn would
imply P = NP.
1.10 The Conjugacy Problem In Zn oφ Z
In this section we present an algorithm that solves both the conju-
gacy decision and search problems in groups of the form Zn oφ Z.
The algorithm we obtain is exponential time with regards to the
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length we define in Section 1.1.3 and polynomial time if we use
the actual word length of the normal form as in [27] rather than
the length of the exponent vector. This work is found in [14] and
is largely based on work due to Bogopolski, Maslakova, Martino,
and Ventura from [7] and Bogopolski, Martino, and Ventura from
[8, 9]. Additionally, we rely on an algorithm due to Kannan and
Lipton from [39].
For reference, for g = gk11 · · · gknn , we have:
|g| = |k1|+ · · ·+ |kn|
1.10.1 The Twisted Conjugacy Problem
Definition 1.10.1. Given a finitely presented group, G, an autor-
morphism φ ∈ Aut(G), and u, v ∈ G we say u and v are twisted
conjugate by φ if there exists x ∈ G such that
v = xuφ(x−1).
If u and v are twisted conjugate by φ we write:
u ∼φ v.
Notice that the standard conjugacy problem is a special case of
the twisted conjugacy problem by taking φ to be the identity.
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In [7] Bogopolski, Martino, Maslakova, and Ventura showed
that the conjugacy problem in free-by-infinite cyclic groups can be
reduced to the twisted conjugacy problem in free groups. Later,
Bogopolski, Martino, and Ventura [9] adapted their previous work
from [7] to solve the conjugacy problem in a variety of groups
extensions. What follows is an adaptation of their algorithm for
free abelian-by-cyclic groups.
1.10.2 The Algorithm
The following lemma and proof is taken directly from the beginning
of section 2 in [7] and adapted to free abelian-by-infinite cyclic
groups.
Lemma 1.10.2. Let u = wts and v = xtr in ZnoφZ be conjugate.
Then s = r and there exists e ∈ Z such that φe(w) ∼φs x in Zn.
Additionally, if φs = φr is the identity, then x = φe(w) for some
e ∈ Z.
Proof. Let a = bte ∈ Zn oφ Z such that v = aua−1. Therefore
xtr = (bte)wts(bte)−1 = btewtst−eb−1 =
bφe(w)tsb−1 = bφe(w)φs(b−1)ts.
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As such, we have:
xtr = bφe(w)φs(b−1)ts
which implies that s = r, and that φe(w) ∼φs x by b.
Given u and v as above, the lemma shows that there are two
cases one must consider to solve the conjugacy decision and search
problems in Zn-by-Z groups. First check if s = r. If not, then
u and v are not conjugate. If they are equal, we then have the
following two cases:
• If φs is trivial, we have to decide if ∃e ∈ Z such that x = φe(w).
• Otherwise, we have to decide if there exists e such that φe(w)
∼φs x.
The first case, namely given two vectors w, x ∈ Zn and φ ∈
GLn(Z) determine if there exists e ∈ Z such that x = φe(w), is
known as the orbit problem over Zn. In [39] Kannan and Lipton
provide a polynomial time algorithm that solves the orbit problem
over Qn. The orbit problem over Zn is a special case of their work,
and as such, their algorithm provides a polynomial time solution
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to the twisted conjugacy problem over Zn in the case that φs is
trivial. If such an e is found that satisfies the orbit problem, then
we have that v = teut−e.
For the second case, we use the fact from the lemma that ∃b ∈
Zn, e ∈ Z such that x = bφe(w)φs(b−1). Before we begin the
algorithm, we state Lemma 1.7 from [7].
Lemma 1.10.3. For any group G, φ ∈ Aut(G), and u ∈ G, u ∼φ
φ(u).
Proof. φ(u) = u−1uφ(u). Therefore u is twisted conjugate over φ
to φ(u) by u−1.
As such, φe(w) ∼φs φe±ks(w) for any k ∈ Z. Therefore, if there
exists an e that satisfies the equation φe(w) ∼φs x, then we can
find such an e among {0, 1, · · · , |s| − 1}.
We can now proceed with the full algorithm. Due to the fact
that x,w ∈ Zn and φ ∈ GLn(Z) it is more convenient to put the
equation x = bφe(w)φs(b−1) into additive notation. We then write:
x = b+ φe(w)− φs(b).
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This yields the equation
x− φe(w) = (Idn − φs)b
where Idn is the n × n identity matrix. As such, we proceed by
solving the system of linear equations given by 0 ≤ e ≤ |s|−1 and
then checking if the solution, b is in Zn.
For a pseudocode version of the algorithm on inputs wts, xtr ∈
Zn oφ Z, see Algorithm 1 (originally appearing in [14]). The
algorithm returns FALSE if the elements are not conjugate, and
a conjugating element if they are.
Algorithm 1 Conjugacy Algorithm for Zn oφ Z
if s 6= r then
return FALSE
else if φs is the identity then
Run Kannan-Lipton algorithm.






while e < |s| do
if ∃b ∈ Zn such that x− φe(w) = (Idn − φs)b then
return bte







In the algorithm above we have two cases each of which can be
dealt with in polynomially many steps with respect to n and |s|.
If s = r 6= 0, we find solutions of an n × n linear system at most
|s| times. On the other hand, if |s| = |r| = 0, we use the algorithm
of Kannan and Lipton which runs in polynomial time. Therefore,
this algorithm is at most polynomial in terms of n and the lengths
of the input words.
It is worth pointing out that unlike many of the algorithms
group theorists study, this algorithm takes as inputs words in their
polycyclic normal forms as opposed to in their geodesic form or
just in any general form. This affects the complexity of the al-
gorithm since the two different representations of group elements
have different lengths.
One reason this is not a major issue is that in a practical setting,
converting words to normal forms is fast (see [21]) and that the
complexity is largely determined by the exponent above the stable
letter (in the notation above, the stable letter is the generator t)
which is just the sums of all exponents above the stable letter
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before collection. It is still open as to whether or not we can
improve this case of the algorithm to be polynomial time when we
define the length of a conjugacy problem as in Section 1.3.
Chapter 2
Properties of Infinite Cyclic
Extensions
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study infinite cyclic extensions of groups that
leave the base group stable under any automorphism. We begin
with structural results of infinite cyclic extensions and then pro-
ceed by studying their automorphism groups. Inspired by [8] we
define an automorphism to be deranged if its abelianization has
no fixed points that are not torsion elements. For groups obtained
through a cyclic extension by a deranged automorphism, we derive
an explicit form for any of their automorphisms. We also prove
structural results about their automorphism groups and show that
an extension by a deranged automorphism is unique up to conju-
gacy class in the outer automorphism group of the base group.
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We proceed by defining the class of H-poly-Z groups. G is
H-poly-Z if G is obtained by successive infinite cyclic extensions
from H. We show then that if the infinite cyclic extensions are
done with “deranged” automorphisms, then any subnormal series
for G with infinite cyclic quotients essentially begins at H and that
G was obtained from H in a unique fashion. We call such a group
G, H-rigid.
We finish by proving a version of the Tits Alternative for the
automorphism group of an H-rigid poly-Z group and show that
either it contains F2 or is virtually polycyclic. More generally we
give criteria for the automorphism group of a deranged extension
to contain a non-abelian free group.
This is joint work with Jordi Delgado, Delaram Kahrobaei, Ha
Lam, and Enric Ventura and can be found in [12].
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2.2 Structure of Infinite Cyclic Extensions and
Deranged Automorphisms
In Section 1.1.3 we discussed the theory of infinite cyclic exten-
sions in the context of poly-Z groups. In this section we present
more general results pertaining to extending an arbitrary group by
Z. In what follows we denote Gφ = G oφ Z. We also refer to the
notation of the last chapter and denote t as the new generator of
the infinite cyclic extension.
Lemma 2.2.1. Let φ be an automorphism of an arbitrary group





where φab ∈ Aut(Gab) denote the abelianization of φ and Id is
the identity map on Gab.
Proof. Let G = 〈X|R〉. Then from Section 1.1.3 we have that
Gφ = 〈X, t|R, txit−1 = φ(xi) : xi ∈ X〉.
When we abelianize, we add in the relations xit = txi and xixj =
xjxi, which in turn implies that xi = φ(xi). Hence:
Gabφ = 〈X, t|R, xi = φ(xi), xit = txi, xixj = xjxi : xi, xj ∈ X〉
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If G is finitely generated, then so is Gφ implying that G
ab
φ is a
finitely generated abelian group. Therefore, by the fundamental
theorem of finitely generated abelian groups we have:
Corollary 2.2.2. If G is finitely generated then Gabφ ' Zr ⊕ T for
some r ∈ Z and T a finite abelian group.
For any automorphism φ ∈ Aut(G) for G finitely generated, we
have the associated abelianization
φab : Zr ⊕ T → Zr ⊕ T
which is also an automorphism. Therefore, it sends Zr onto Zr. We
can then quotient out Gab by the torsion to obtain a well defined
automorphism
φab∗ : Zr → Zr
which can be thought of as a matrix in GLr(Z).
Definition 2.2.3. We say an automorphism φ ∈ Aut(G) is de-
ranged if φab∗ has no non-trivial fixed points.
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This definition is inspired by the type of automorphisms stud-
ied in Theorem 2.4 from [8] where the authors studied free-by-
cyclic groups and showed that with a similar definition on auto-
morphisms, G is characteristic in Gφ when φ is deranged. Namely,
ψ(G) ⊂ G for all ψ ∈ Aut(Gφ). For this chapter we show simi-
lar results where G is an arbitrary group and use them to study
Aut(Gφ).
Theorem 2.2.4. Let G be a finitely generated group, φ ∈ Aut(G).
Then the following are equivalent:
(a) φ is deranged.
(b) Gabφ ' Z⊕ T for some finite abelian group T .
(c) G is the only normal subgroup of Gφ with quotient isomorphic
to Z.
(d) For all endomorphisms ψ ∈ End(Gφ), ψ(G) ⊂ G.









Im(φab−Id) is a subgroup of Zr⊕T and has its own torsion-free part
that is a subgroup of Zr and its own torsion part that is a subgroup
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where T ′ is the quotient of T by the torsion part of Im(φab − Id).
Now, Zr/Im(φab∗ − Id) is finite if and only if det(φab∗ − Id) 6= 0
which happens if and only if φab∗ has no non-trivial fixed points.
This proves equivalence of (a) and (b).
To see (b) if and only if (c), first note that every epimorphism
from Gφ onto Z factors through Gabφ . Also note that if (b) holds,
then G is exactly the kernel of the map that sends G ⊂ Gφ to Gabφ
and then to Z. This implies that G is exactly the kernel of any map
from G to Z since G gets sent to the torsion part of Gabφ . Therefore,
if there existed a second subgroup H such that Gφ/H ' Z, then
G would be the kernel of the quotient map implying that G = H.
On the other hand, if Gabφ had higher rank than 1, there would
clearly be multiple groups with quotient Z.
Finally we do (b) if and only if (d). If (b) holds, then Gabφ ' Z⊕T
where G is the pre-image of T under the abelianization quotient
map. Therefore T is invariant under any endomorphism of Gabφ and
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G is invariant under any endomorphism of Gφ. Now we prove (d)
implies (b) by using the contrapositive. Say that Gabφ ' Z2⊕T , and
let s be the generator of the additional Z. Therefore, there exists
an element of G that maps to a power of s under the abelianization
quotient map. Then there is an endomorphism that sends G to
the cyclic subgroup generated by the pre-image of s implying G is
not fully invariant. Note that this proof still holds for when the
abelianization has higher rank.
2.3 Automorphisms of Deranged Extensions
We proved in the previous section that when φ is deranged, G is
characteristic in Gφ. This allows us to prove the following propo-
sition about Aut(Gφ):
Proposition 2.3.1. Let Ψ ∈ Aut(Gφ) with φ deranged. Then Ψ
is of the following form:
Ψ(g) = ψ(g)
Ψ(t) = htε
where ε = ±1, ψ ∈ Aut(G), and h ∈ G are such that γhψεψ = ψφ
where γh(g) = hgh
−1. Additionally, any homomorphism satisfying
these requirements is in Aut(Gφ)
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Proof. First we prove Ψ|G = ψ is an automorphism of G. All
that remains is to show that ψ is surjective. Since Gabφ ' Z ⊕ T ,
x ∈ Gφ gets sent to T under the abelianization quotient map if and
only if x ∈ G. Therefore, xab gets sent to T by Ψab which means
that Ψ(x) ∈ G and Ψ(G) ⊂ G. Moreover, it also implies that Ψ
also sends everything outside of G outside of G. Since Ψ is onto,
Ψ(G) = ψ(G) = G.
Since Ψ sends G to G, for Ψ(Gφ) to contain t, t must get sent
to a word of the form htε for ε = ±1.






Finally, note that any map of the above form is necessarily an
automorphism.
It is also the case that the above proof will actually work when-
ever G is characteristic in Gφ.
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Following the form of automorphisms in the above proposition,
we will denote Ψε,ψ,h as the automorphism that sends g ∈ G to






This form of automorphisms allows us to characterize automor-
phisms in Aut(Gφ) by whether ε is 1 or −1. We call ε the signum
and have Aut+(Gφ) and Aut
−(Gφ) denote the set of automor-
phisms with positive and negative signum respectively. Therefore:
Aut(Gφ) = Aut
+(Gφ) t Aut−(Gφ).
Aut+(Gφ) is never empty. For instance, it contains the identity,
inner automorphisms, and Ψ1,φ,1. On the other hand, there may
be no automorphisms with signum −1.
Notice that the composition of two automorphisms with posi-
tive signum is again positive. Also, the inverse of a positive au-
tomorphism is positive. This implies that Aut+(Gφ) is a normal
subgroup of Aut(Gφ). Due to the partition above, Aut
+(Gφ) is of
index at most two in Aut(Gφ) depending on whether or not there
exist automorphisms with signum −1.
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Lemma 2.3.2. The map
Aut+(Gφ)→ Aut(G)
Ψ 7→ ψ = Ψ|G
is a well-defined homomorphism with the center of G as its kernel
and image C̃([φ]) where
C̃([φ]) = {ψ ∈ Aut(G)|ψφψ−1φ−1 ∈ Inn(G)}
Therefore, Aut+(Gφ) fits into the short exact sequence:
1→ Z(G)→ Aut+(Gφ)→ C̃([φ])→ 1
Proof. We first look at the second restriction map which we call
π. One can see that π is a homomorphism by the composition
laws from Proposition 2.3.1. If Ψ1,ψ,h gets sent to the identity,
then ψ = Id and γhφ = φ which implies that h ∈ Z(G). As such,
the map from Z(G) into Aut+(Gφ) given by h 7→ γh is injective.
Moreover, Ψ1,ψ,h ∈ Aut+(Gφ) implies that ψ commutes with φ up
to an inner automorphism.
To finish the section, we show that any two extensions by de-
ranged automorphisms are isomorphic if and only if the two au-
tomorphisms are in the same conjugacy class in Out(G). From
the proof, it can be seen that the backward direction holds for an
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arbitrary group whereas the forward direction will not. See [8] for
a counterexample in which G is the free group on three generators.
This result was also proven independently in [11] and [3].
Proposition 2.3.3. Let Gα = G oα Z and Gβ = G oβ Z. If α
is deranged, then Gα ' Gβ if and only if ∃w ∈ G, ε = ±1, and
ψ ∈ Aut(G) such that β = γwψαεψ−1.
Proof. The proof of the “if” part can be found in [8]. To be brief,
an explicit isomorphism between Gα and Gγwψαεψ−1 is g 7→ ψ(g)
for g ∈ G and t 7→ wsε where t generates Z in Gα and s generates
Z in Gγwψαεψ−1.
In the other direction, let ψ : Gα → Gβ be an isomorphism. We
first show that ψ|G : G→ G is an isomorphism. We have that f |G
is linear and injective, so we only need to prove surjectivity. Since
α deranged, Gabα ' Z⊕ T ' Gabβ . Therefore, if we let g ∈ G, then
(f(g))ab = fab(gab) implies that (f(g))ab ∈ T which means that
f(g) ∈ G. Additionally, any word containing the letter t does not
abelianize into torsion which means that it does not get sent into
G by f . But since f is surjective onto Gβ, f(G) = G. This in turn
means that ψ must send t to an element of the form hs±1 where s
generates the Z in Gβ.
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If ε = 1 then we can take w = h−1. If ε = −1, then we get:
β(g) = γψαψ−1(h)ψα
−1ψ−1(g)
and can take w = ψαψ−1(h)
Corollary 2.3.4. Aut−(Gφ) is non-empty if and only if Gφ '
Gφ−1.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 2.3.1 in that Aut−(Gφ)
has an automorphism, ψ, with signum −1, if and only if γhφ−1ψ =
ψφ. This is the case if and only if φ and φ−1 are conjugate in
Out(G).
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2.4 Rigid Poly-Z Groups
Definition 2.4.1. We say a group G is poly-Z relative to a sub-
group H if G admits a finite subnormal series
H = G0 / G1 / · · · / Gn = G
such that Gi/Gi−1 ' Z for i = 1, · · · , n. We also write that G
is H-poly-Z. Such a subnormal series can be called an H-poly-Z
series.
In this way, we can view any poly-Z group as {1}-poly-Z or
H-poly-Z where H is itself poly-Z.
Definition 2.4.2. We say that a G0-poly-Z series
G0 / G1 / · · · / Gn = G
extends through a subgroup H if one of the following conditions
hold:
(i) the subgroup H already belongs to the series (H = Gi for
some i).
(ii) there exists a poly-Z series from H to G0.
Note that in either case, there is a poly-Z series from H to G
that overlaps a final segment of the original series. In particular,
G is H-poly-Z.
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Definition 2.4.3. A group G is rigidly poly-Z relative to a sub-
group H (or H-rigid), if every poly-Z series for G extends uniquely
through H. Namely, every poly-Z series extends through H, and
the extended series from H to G is also unique.
Note that this means the extending automorphisms can be dif-
ferent, but the subgroups the same. In fact, considering Propo-
sition 2.3.3, there will in general be many automorphisms that
give you the same poly-Z series.
Proposition 2.4.4. Let G by an H-poly-Z group. Then the fol-
lowing are equivalent:
(1) G is H-rigid.
(2) Every poly-Z tower from H to G is made by extensions by
deranged automorphisms.
(3) There exists a deranged poly-Z tower from H to G.
Proof. [(1) =⇒ (2)] Let G be H-rigid and suppose that there
exists a poly-Z tower from H to G with some extending automor-
phism, φ, not deranged. Say Gi+1 = Gi oφ Z. Then, Gi+1 has a
subgroup, Hi 6= Gi, with quotient isomorphic to Z. Therefore, G
is not H-rigid because either H is not a subgroup of Hi or there
are two different poly-Z series extending through H.
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[(2) =⇒ (3)] is trivial.
[(3) =⇒ (1)] Let H = G0 / G1 / · · · / Gn = G. Then for every
i ≥ 1, there is a unique subgroup of Gi with quotient isomorphic to
Z. Therefore, the unique subgroup of Gi is Gi−1 and this continues
all the way down to H being the unique subgroup of G1 such that
G1/H ' Z. This implies that any poly-Z tower for G can be
uniquely extended down to H.
2.5 A Tits Alternative For Automorphisms of
a Rigid Poly-Z Group
The original Tits Alternative [63] states that any linear group is
either virtually solvable or contains a non-abelian free group. Both
virtually polycyclic groups and their automorphism groups are lin-
ear ([59] chapter 5) . Moreover, it as a theorem of Mal’cev that if
the automorphism group a virtually polycyclic group is solvable,
then it is in fact polycyclic (see [59] Chapter 2 section B theo-
rem 1). As such, a Tits Alternative for automorphism groups of
virtually polycyclic groups states that such automorphism groups
are either polycyclic or contain a non-abelian free group. See [20]
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for a more detailed study of the Tits Alternative for a virtually
polycyclic group.
Proposition 2.5.1. Let G be an H-rigid relatively poly-Z group.
Also, let F2 be the non-abelian free group on two generators. If
F2  C̃([φ]) where the first group in the tower is G1 = H oφ Z,
then F2  Aut(G)
To prove this me make use of the following lemma:
Lemma 2.5.2. Let G contain subgroups A = 〈a, b〉 ' F2 and K
such that F2 ∩K = 〈w〉. Then G contains a subgroup isomorphic
to F2, L, such that L ∩K = {1}.
Proof. Take a word k ∈ A such that k /∈ 〈w〉. Then 〈k, wkw−1〉 is
isomorphic to F2 and does not contain w.
Now we can prove the proposition:
Proof. To prove this we examine the short exact sequence from
Lemma 2.3.2 and show that if F2  C̃(φ) then F2  Aut+(Gφ).
If this holds then F2  Aut(Gφ) because Aut+(Gφ) is a finite index
subgroup.
We proceed by contradiction. Assume that A ≤ Aut+(Gφ)
where A ' F2, but that C̃([φ]) contains no subgroup isomorphic
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to F2. Note that since Z(G) is abelian, A∩Z(G) is either trivial or
is an infinite cyclic group 〈w〉. By applying the previous lemma,
we can then assume without loss of generality that A ∩ Z(G) =
{1}. Therefore A embeds into Aut+(Gφ)/Z(G) ' C̃([φ]) which
contradicts that C̃([φ]) has no subgroups isomorphic to F2.
2.6 Recognizing Finitely Presented-by-ZGroups
In this section we describe an algorithm that takes as input a pre-
sentation of a finitely presented-by-Z group, and recursively enu-
merates its presentations. Following that, we show that determin-
ing that an arbitrary finitely presented group is finitely presented-
by-Z is undecidable. For the remainder of this section we denote
finitely presented (generated)-byZ as f.p(g)-by-Z. Before we be-
gin, let us define what we call the canonical presentation for G, an
f.p-by-Z group. A canonical presentation will be one of the form:
G = 〈g1, g2, · · · , gn, t | R, tg1t−1 = φ(g1), · · · , tgnt−1 = φ(gn)〉.
Namely, we can represent G as a set of generators g1, · · · , gn
and a stable letter t, where relations in the set R do not contain t
and the remaining relations can be expressed as conjugation of a
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generator by t yielding an automorphism of 〈g1, · · · , gn | R〉. From
Section 1.3.2 any f.p-by-Z group has such a presentation and any
group with such a presentation is f.p-by-Z.
Proposition 2.6.1. There is an algorithm that takes as input
an arbitrary presentation of an f.p-by-Z group, G, and returns a
canonical presentation. As such, the set of finite presentations of
f.p-by-Z groups is recursively enumerable.
Proof. We begin the proof by first describing how to verify that the
automorphism φ in a canonical presentation is an automorphism
of the base group. This process is guaranteed to terminate in a
finite number of steps if φ is an automorphism (implying that our
presentation is canonical) but may never terminate if φ is not.
We will describe two potentially infinite processes that altogether
verify that φ is an automorphism. Each will terminate if φ is an
automorphism.
We first verify that φ is well defined. This can be done by check-
ing that the images of the relators in R under φ are trivial. Since
the base group may have undecidable word problem, we cannot
do that by merely checking that each image is trivial. Instead we
begin the potentially infinite process of verifying that each word
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is trivial by enumerating all words in the normal closure of R in
the base group and checking if the finite images of the words in R
eventually appear. If not all of the images are trivial, this process
is not guaranteed to terminate, but if φ is a well-defined automor-
phism we can verify that the images are trivial in a finite number
of steps.
To check that φ is bijective, we attempt to construct an inverse.
This process again cannot be done deterministically, but will pro-
duce an inverse if an inverse exists. We begin by enumerating all
possible maps, ψ : gi 7→ wi of the base group. We can verify well
definedness by using the process of the previous paragraph. If that
process terminates, we then verify that ψφ(gi) = φψ(gi) = gi which
can be done again by enumerating elements in the normal closure





we find a well defined inverse ψ, we then know that φ is a bijection.
In order to find a canonical presentation for our input group, G,
we begin by looking at G under all possible Tietze transformations.
Since G is f.p-by-Z, we know that a canonical presentation exists,
and as such, we will eventually find some combination of Tietze
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transformations that yield a canonical presentation. As we enu-
merate, we look for candidate presentations, namely presentations
that have the same form as a canonical presentation, but where φ
may not be an automorphism of the base group. Each time we find
a candidate presentation, we begin the parallel process of deter-
mining if φ is an automorphism. If φ is not an automorphism, this
process may never terminate. As such, we continue searching for
more candidate presentations while simultaneously checking that
φ is an automorphism. Each time we find a new candidate presen-
tation, we begin a new, potentially infinite, parallel sub-process.
This finite number of potential infinite processes can be done si-
multaneously by alternating steps for each of them. When we
finally verify that a candidate presentation is in fact a canonical
presentation for G, we then terminate all ongoing processes.
Since we will eventually find a canonical presentation by Ti-
etze transformations and since we can verify that the φ for this
presentation is an automorphism in a finite number of steps, this
algorithm will eventually terminate.
We will now show that determining if an arbitrary f.p group is
f.p-by-Z (or even f.g-by-Z) is undecidable. To do this, we begin
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with a lemma and a corollary:
Lemma 2.6.2. Let H be a finitely generated group and write ∗∞i∈ZH
as
〈· · · , H−2, H−1, H0, H1, · · · | · · · , R−2, R−1, R0, R1, · · · 〉
where the Hi and Ri are distinct disjoint copies of H and the re-
lators of H respectively and are indexed by i ∈ Z. We then have
that:
∗∞i∈ZH oφ Z ' H ∗ Z
where φ sends hi ∈ Hi to its copy hi+1 ∈ Hi+1.
Proof. We have that:
∗∞i∈ZH oφ Z = 〈Hi, t | Ri, thit−1 = hi+1〉




is an isomorphism between ∗∞i∈ZH oφ Z and H ∗ Z.
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Corollary 2.6.3. Let G = H ∗ Z where H is f.g and has finite
abelianization. Then G is f.g-by-Z if and only if H is trivial.
Proof. First note that Gab ' Hab ⊕ Z ' T ⊕ Z where T is a
finite abelian group. Based on the proof of Theorem 2.2.4 we
have that G has a unique normal subgroup with quotient Z. From
the previous lemma, this unique subgroup is isomorphic to ∗∞i∈ZH
which is finitely generated if and only H is trivial.
We now use the fact that in the variety of f.g groups, triviality
is not recursively recognizable from a finite presentation (see [48]).
Note that this can be restricted to f.g perfect groups since one can
verify from its finite presentation that any non-perfect f.g group is
non-trivial by taking its abelianization and verifying that it is non
trivial.
Theorem 2.6.4. There is no algorithm to determine if a finitely
presented group given by a finite presentation is f.p-by-Z or f.g-by-
Z.
Note that being f.p-by-Z is not a Markov property since any
finitely presented group, G, embeds into G × Z which is also f.p-
by-Z.
Proof. Let P be a perfect group given by a finite presentation and
form G = P ∗Z. From Corollary 2.6.3 we have that G is f.g-by-Z
66
and f.p-by-Z if and only P is non-trivial. Therefore determining
that G is f.g-by-Z or f.p-by-Z is equivalent to determining if P
is trivial. Since determining if f.p perfect groups are trivial is
undecidable, determining if G is f.g-by-Z is undecidable.
2.7 Undecidability Properties of the BNS In-
variant
In this section we point out how our results affect the computation
of the Bieri-Neumann-Strebel Invariant from [5]. In what follows,
we introduce the BNS invariant using the definition from [44].
For a finitely generated group G with b1(G) = n, we define the
character sphere of G:
S(G) = (Hom(G,R)− {0})/R+ ∼= Sn−1.
Each [χ] ∈ S(G) yields the submonoid
Gχ = {g ∈ G | χ(g) ≥ 0}
of G. Fix a finite generating set X of G. We now define
Σ = {[χ] ∈ S(G) | Gχ is a connected subset of Γ(G,X)}.
It is the case that Gχ is connected regardless of the choice of finite
generating set. Σ is known to be related to the set of infinite
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cyclic quotients with finitely generated kernel (see [52]). To see
the relation between Σ and finitely generated subgroups we need
to give one more definition. For any subgroup H ≤ G we define
S(G,H) = {[χ] ∈ S(G) | χ(H) = 0}.
Following this we state part of Theorem B1 from [5].
Theorem 2.7.1. Let N be a normal subgroup of G with G/N
abelian. Then N is finitely generated if and only if S(G,N) ⊆ Σ.
In the case where G = H oφ Z is obtained as a deranged cyclic
extension, we have that S(G) = S0 = {−1, 1} since b1(G) = 1.
Fix an epimorphism χ : G  Z. Since H is the unique normal
subgroup of G with quotient Z, S(G,H) consists only of χ and −χ.
Since the kernel of each map is H, Theorem 2.7.1 implies that
either Σ = ∅, if H is not finitely generated, and Σ = {χ,−χ} =
S(G,H) = S(G) if H is finitely generated.
From the proof Theorem 2.6.4, we have that there is a family
of finitely presented groups with rank one abelianization of the
form P ∗ Z, where the problem of deciding if a group within the
family is [f.g]-by-Z is undecidable. Additionally, from the previous
paragraph, we have that this problem is equivalent to determining
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if the kernel of the epimorphism onto Z from such a group is finitely
generated, is then equivalent to determining Σ for G. As such we
have:
Theorem 2.7.2. Given a finite presentation of an f.p-by-Z group,






In this chapter we change gears and talk about a secret sharing
protocol that involves non-commutative groups. Secret Sharing
essentially solves the problem of how to split a piece of information
(a secret) amongst multiple parties such that no single party can
recover the secret, but that certain subsets of participants can
combine their information to recover the secret. Note that this
problem is non-trivial because each subset needs to recover the
same secret.
Secret sharing schemes are ideal for situations in which it is
important that the secret is robust (can be recovered easily when
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information is lost) and where a high level of security is still needed.
The scheme is secure if done correctly, and if shares are lost, the
secret can still be recovered. Secret sharing has applications in
multiparty encryption, Byzantine encryption, threshold encryp-
tion. See [4] for a detailed introduction to secret sharing and its
applications.
In this chapter we first detail the classical secret sharing schemes
of Blakley and Shamir before moving on to later adjustments by
Feldman and Pedersen that account for cheating dealers or par-
ticipants and Herzberg et. al. that account for long term storage
of shares. Finally, we outline recent work in secret sharing using
non-commutative groups by Habeeb, Kahrobaei, and Shpilrain [30]
and an original adjustment of their scheme.
3.2 Formal Definition
A secret sharing scheme consists of a dealer, n participants, that
we label P1, · · · , Pn, and an access structure A ⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} such
that for all A ∈ A and A ⊆ B, B ∈ A.
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To share a secret, s, the dealer runs an algorithm:
Share(s) = (s1, · · · , sn)
and then distributes each share si to Pi.
In order to recover the secret, participants can run the algorithm
Recover which has the property that for all A ∈ A:
Recover({si : i ∈ A}) = s
and if A /∈ A then running Recover is either computationally in-
feasible or impossible.
As such, only sets of participants in A can perform Recover
and access the secret. The monotonicity of A is also apparent in
that if A ∈ A and A ⊆ B then the set of participants in A could
also recover the secret for B. As such, B should also be in A.
Definition 3.2.1. A secret sharing scheme is called perfect if
∀A /∈ A the shares si ∈ A together give no information about
s.
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3.3 Classical Secret Sharing
A common access structures in secret sharing is the (k, n) thresh-
old:
A = {A ∈ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} : |A| ≥ k}.
Namely, A consists of all subsets of the n participants of size k
or greater. We call such a secret sharing scheme a (k,n) threshold
scheme. In what follows we first give a trivial example of an (n, n)
scheme and then two schemes that solve the problem for arbitrary
k.
Example: A trivial (n, n) scheme can be constructed as follows to
share a secret s ∈ {0, 1}m:
• The dealer randomly chooses s1, · · · , sn−1 ∈ {0, 1}m and sets
sn = s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sn−1 ⊕ s
where ⊕ is the standard XOR.
• The dealer distributes si to each Pi over a private channel.
To recover the secret, all the participants must combine their in-
formation and compute s = s1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ sn.
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The problem of discovering a non-trivial (k, n) scheme was solved
independently by G. Blakley [6] and A. Shamir [60] in 1979. Notice
that this problem becomes non-trivial in part because the shares
have to be consistent. This means any k person subset has to
recover the same secret.
3.3.1 Blakley’s Scheme
In Blakley’s (k, n) scheme, the secret is an element s ∈ Rk. The
dealer distributes to each Pi the equation for a hyperplane in Rk
such that each hyperplane contains the point s and such that any k
of the hyperplanes are linearly independent. To recover the secret
any k participants can use the equations for their hyperplanes to
solve the linear system and get a unique solution. The scheme is
consistent because any k of the hyperplanes are linearly indepen-
dent and each plane contains s.
Example: Consider a (3,5) threshold using Blakely’s scheme. Let
us have the secret be (1, 2, 3). The shares could be:
s1 = {2x+ y + z = 7}
s2 = {3x− 6y + z = −9}
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s3 = {−x+ 7y + 3z = 22}
s4 = {4x− 2y − 2z = −6}
s5 = {x+ y + z = 6}
One can verify that this works by checking that (1, 2, 3) is a solu-
tion to each system and that the planes are linearly independent.
3.3.2 Shamir’s Scheme
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme also involves linear algebra at its
core, but rather than involving hyperplanes explicitly, it utilizes
the linear relationships between polynomials over finite fields. For
Shamir’s (k, n)-scheme, the secret s is an element of Zp where we
only require that p > n. To share s, the dealer does the following:
• The dealer randomly selects a1, · · · , ak−1 ∈ Zp such that ak−1 6=
0 and constructs the polynomial f(x) = ak−1x
k−1+ · · ·+a1x+
s.
• For each participant Pi the dealer publishes distinct corre-
sponding xi ∈ Zp. The dealer then distributes the share
si = f(xi) to each Pi over a private channel.
Since each share represents a distinct point on the same degree
k − 1 polynomial, f , and since each share is unique, each subset
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of k participants can uniquely reconstruct the polynomial and find
its constant coefficient. If we view Pi as (xi, f(xi)), the first k par-











Another way of viewing polynomial interpolation is as follows:
in order to reconstruct a polynomial f(x) = s+ a1x+ · · · ak−1xk−1
given points (x1, f(x1)), · · · , (xk, f(xk)), one can solve for the co-
efficients column in the following system of linear equations:
x1
k−1 · · · x1 1
x2
k−1 · · · x2 1


















This view of interpolation shows that Shamir’s scheme is per-
fect. If there were less than k shares, the above linear system
would not have a unique solution for a0.
Example: Let k = 3 and n = 5, p = 7, and s = 4. The dealer also
chooses the polynomial
f(x) = 5x2 + x+ 4 mod 7.
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Note that we are taking everything in this example over Z7. The
dealer also chooses the public xi = i. Than the shares to P1, · · · , P5
are:
s1 = (1, 3)
s2 = (2, 5)
s3 = (3, 3)
s4 = (4, 4)
s5 = (5, 1)
Now say that P1, P2, and P3 wish to combine their shares to recover























2 + 6 + 3 mod 7 ≡ 4 = s.
3.4 Verifiable Secret Sharing
In the above secret sharing schemes, there are no methods for any
one participant to protect themselves from a cheating dealer or
participant. For instance, using Shamir’s or Blakely’s schemes, if a
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single cheating participant were to lie about their share during the
recovery process, their set in the access structure would recover an
incorrect secret while the cheating participant would have enough
information to recover the secret on his/her own.
Definition 3.4.1. A verifiable secret sharing scheme (VSS) is a
secret sharing scheme where extra steps are added to allow partic-
ipants to verify the consistency of their shares based entirely off of
information provided by the dealer before running Recover. It is
also necessary that such a verification process requires no interac-
tion between participants.
In this section we present two verifiable secret sharing schemes
based on Shamir’s scheme. See also [38] for a verifiable secret
sharing scheme using non-commutative groups.
3.4.1 The Discrete Logarithm Problem
Definition 3.4.2. The discrete logarithm problem in a finite cyclic
group G of order p is the problem of finding a solution for x in the
equation ax ≡ b mod p where a, b ∈ G.
It is conjectured that there exists no polynomial time algorithm
to solve the discrete logarithm problem in certain subgroups of
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(Zp)× where p is a large prime and p = 2q+1 where q is also prime.
Such prime numbers in cryptography are called strong primes.
We do not use (Zp)× itself for three main reasons. The first two
are that its order, p− 1, is even and therefore not prime and that
we want p− 1 to have large prime factors. Both of these concerns
are due to the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm which in some cases can
exploit these facts to give more efficient solutions to the discrete
logarithm problem. For this reason we work in a subgroup gener-
ated by an element of order q, namely the subgroup of quadratic
residues. The other advantage is that after Zp is determined, it
is easy to find a generator for Zq. Since Zq is the subgroup of
quadratic residues it consists of all elements of (Zp)× with square
roots. Therefore, a non-trivial element can be obtained, by squar-
ing an element x ∈ (Zp)× and checking that x2 is non-trivial. If
it isn’t, then it generates the subgroup of quadratic residues since
the order of the subgroup is q which is prime.
At this point in time, no efficient algorithms have been imple-
mented to solve the discrete logarithm problem over these groups.
As such, at least for now, it is secure for real world cryptography.
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3.4.2 Feldman Secret Sharing
In this section we present a VSS scheme due to Feldman [24]. Let
p be a large prime such that p = 2q + 1 where q is also prime.
Also let g ∈ Zp be an element of order q. We choose g and p so
that the subgroup generated by g has a difficult discrete logarithm
problem. Namely, if gx = h mod p, it is difficult to determine x
from g and h. In order to verifiably share a secret, s ∈ Zp where
n is the number of participants, and k is the threshold, the dealer
does the following:
• Assigns to each participant Pi a public xi ∈ Zp and chooses
aj ∈ Zp randomly for j = 1, · · · , k−1 to create the polynomial
f(x) = s+ a1x+ · · ·+ ak−1xk−1.
• Over a private channel sends each Pi, f(xi) and further pub-
lish q, gs, and gai. Notice that the secret, individual shares,
and the coeffecients of the polynomial are kept hidden due to
the assumption that the discrete log problem is hard base g.
• In order to verify that their share is consistent, each partici-
pant Pi checks that






• After each participant has checked their shares, for consis-
tency, they can start the recovery process. Notice that any
share Pi encounters can be verified in the above fashion.
3.4.3 Pedersen Secret Sharing
In the above method we rely on the hardness assumptions of the
discrete logarithm problem to assume that gs does not reveal s. In
this version due to Pedersen [53], the public information gives no
information about s.
Let p, q, g be the same as with Feldman. We also choose d ∈ Zp
and set h = gd mod p. The dealer generates two random polyno-
mials in γ(x) and δ(x) in Zq[x] with coefficients {γi}0≤i≤k−1 and
{δi}0≤i≤k−1 where δ0 = s and s is the secret. The dealer publishes
εi = g
δihγi mod p and privately distributes the share {δ(xi), γ(xi)}
to each Pi. Each participant can then check their shares by check-
ing that:
gδ(xi)hγ(xi) = (ε0)(ε1)





xi · · · (εk−1)xi
k−1
=








The advantage of this to Feldman’s verification is that publishing
gshz = gs(gd)z = gs+dz gives information about s+dz which in turn
gives no information about s. As such, even an adversary with
unbounded computational power could not use that information
to find the secret.
3.5 Proactive Secret Sharing
An additional problem with the classical secret sharing schemes of
Blakley or Shamir is that there are no provisions on storing shares.
When these protocols are enacted using computers it is necessary
to store the shares in locations that may be accessed through a
network, or are just not perfectly secure. Even if it is difficult to
hack into somewhere where secrets are being stored, over a long
time period, it may be possible for an adversary to find enough
shares to compute the secret themselves.
One possible way to solve this problem would be to update
the secret, but in many cases this is not always possible. For
instance if the secret were a legal document, you would not want
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to change it. Even decrypting a ciphertext and then encrypting it
with a different key would not solve that problem since decrypting
the message multiple times can expose the secret. This may be
the case if an adversary is able to hack into a server while it is
decrypting.
As such, it makes more sense to update the shares while keeping
the secret the same. In this way, any adversary would have to
obtain enough shares before all the old shares are erased and the
new shares are being used. Any old shares the adversary may
have already obtained would then be useless to recover the secret
as using them with the new shares would be inconsistent. In this
section we present methods that can be seen in Herzberg et. al.
[32] and Jarecki [34].
A simple way to update shares using Shamir’s scheme would be
the following:
• The dealer generates a random polynomial in Zp[x],
F (x) = b1x+ · · · bk−1xk−1.
In particular, the constant term is 0.
• To each Pi the dealer sends F (xi) over a private channel.
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• Each participant creates their new share s′i = si+F (xi) where
si is their original share and then erases si.
In this way when the participants want to recover the secret, the
polynomial they would obtain after interpolation is (F + P )(x)
where P (x) is the original polynomial. Moreover, the constant
term in the new polynomial is s meaning that the participants
recover the same secret. The above protocol could be amended by
not including the dealer, namely having the participants update
their shares together. This can be done by doing the following:
• Each participant, Pi randomly generates a polynomial δi(x) ∈
Zp[x] that has constant term 0.
• To each Pj, i 6= j, Pi sends Pj, δi(xj) over a private channel.
• Pi computes its new share s′i = si + δ1(xi) + · · · + δn(xi) and
erases all the information except for s′i.
A possible setting for proactive secret sharing is one in which the
participants are servers that the shares are stored on. The servers
are vulnerable to an adversary that can break into a server and
learn secret information it holds, disconnect it, change its behavior,
or anything that prevents a server from correctly doing its job.
Since any server is vulnerable on some level (very little in an actual
84
setting is perfectly secure) it is in their best interest to update their
shares periodically.
In this scenario the servers will update their shares after some
specific time period. Each update will consist of share recovery
(recovering any corrupted shares) and share renewal. The following
can be seen in greater detail in Jarecki’s masters thesis [34]. Also
note that methods described in the previous section are used to
make steps verifiable.
3.5.1 Initialization
We choose, g, h ∈ Zp such that an adversary does not know d =
logg h. We also have s ∈ Zp as the secret and simplify the above
protocols so that xi = i mod p. To also simplify notation we de-
scribe this protocol as having a (k + 1, n) access structure.
Each server, Pi, begins with the share {si(0), zi(0)} such that
there are two polynomials f (0)(x) and g(0)(x) where f (0)(0) = s,
f (0)(i) = si
(0), and g(0)(i) = zi
(0).
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In addition the servers make use of a secure public key encryp-
tion scheme with encryption function Enc and a secure signature
scheme Sig.
3.5.2 Share Renewal
The share renewal protocol borrows elements of Pedersen’s VSS
in addition to some other technical elements. This is the share
renewal protocol for each server at time period t:
• Pi picks 2k random elements {δim, γim}m∈{1,··· ,k} from Zp to
define the polynomials δi(x) = δi1x + · · · δikxk and γi(x) =
γi1x+ · · · γikxk
• Pi computes εim = gδimhγim for all 1 ≤ m ≤ k and uij = δi(j)
and wij = γi(j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
• Pi broadcasts V SSi(t) = (i, t, {εim}km=1, {Encj(uij, wij)}nj 6=i) and
the signature Sigi(V SSi
(t)). In this case Encj and Sigi are
encryption using a public key provided by Pj and signing a
message with the private key of Pi.







Pi then broadcasts a message stating if the verification was
successful or unsuccessful.
• Based on a voting procedure the servers can together deter-
mine the set of servers that have been corrupted. The details
of the process can be found in [34]. It is important to note
that different kinds of corruption can result in having a server
broadcast a faulty message of success or failure in the previ-
ous step. In doing this step each Pi is able to determine which
servers sent out correct information in the previous step and
use those servers to update their shares.













where the j are taken over the non-corrupted servers identified
in the previous step.
3.5.3 Share Recovery
An important part of the proactive secret sharing in [34] is the
share recovery phase where corrupted servers get new shares. Al-
though, the method of doing so will not be detailed here, the basic
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idea is simple to understand. We also let the corrupted servers get
indexed by r rather than i or j.
For each corrupted participant Pr, each non-corrupted server Pi
creates polynomials δi(x) and γi(x) such that δi(r) = γi(r) = 0. Pi
then creates the new share




i = zi +
∑
γj(i)
where the j are taken over the non-corrupted servers and xi is Pi’s
current share. Each Pi sends this to Pr in a similar fashion to
V SSi in the previous step so that all the necessary information is
private and verifiable. After verification, Pr interpolates over the
s′i and the z
′
i to determine their new share (sr, zr). This share is
consistent, namely sr and zr lie on the same polynomials as all
















γj(r)) = (δ(r), γ(r)) .
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3.6 Secret Sharing Using Non-Abelian Groups
We now introduce a secret sharing scheme due to Habeeb, Kahrobaei,
and Shpilrain [30]. To use this secret sharing scheme, we require a
finitely presented group G, with an efficiently solvable word prob-
lem. By this we mean that there exists an efficient algorithm that
takes as input a word w written in the generators of G and decides
if w represents the trivial word. We first present an (n, n) thresh-
old scheme and then expand it to the (k, n) case for arbitrary k by
using Shamir’s scheme.
3.6.1 (n, n) Threshold Scheme
In this case the secret, s, is an element of {0, 1}k which we view
as a column vector. The setting is initialized by making the set
of letters, X = {x1, · · · , xn}, public. To distribute the shares the
dealer does the following:
• Distributes to each Pi over a private channel a set of words
Ri in the alphabet X
±1 that define the group Gi = 〈X|Ri〉.
• Randomly generates the shares si ∈ {0, 1}k for i = 1, · · · , n−1
and sn = s −
∑n−1
j=0 sj where the addition is bitwise addition
in Fm2 . Note that each si can be seen as a vector in Fm2 .
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• Publishes words wji over the alphabet X±1 such that a word
wji is trivial in Gi if sji = 1 and non-trivial if sji = 0.
The participant Pi then finds their share si by deciding if each
of the wji are trivial or non-trivial for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. By viewing
trivial words as 1 in their vector and non-trivial words as 0, Pi can
successfully recreate si. Following that, all participants can add
their shares to recover the secret.
Note that even though the wji are sent over an open channel,
the shares remain secure since the Ri are private. Therefore no
other participant can recover si from the wji since only Pi knows
Gi.
3.6.2 (k, n) Threshold Scheme
In [30] the authors extend the above scheme to a (k, n) thresh-
old via Shamir’s scheme. As is the case with Shamir’s scheme,
the secret s is an element of Zp and the shares, si, correspond to
points on a polynomial of degree k − 1 with constant term s. In
order to use the same logic as the (n, n) threshold presented above,
participants view their share as its binary representation and par-
ticipants fully recover their shares by checking which words are
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trivial in their individual group. After each participant has recon-
structed their share, the secret can be recovered via polynomial
interpolation.
• The dealer randomly selects a1, · · · , ak−1 ∈ Zp such that ak−1 6=
0 and constructs the polynomial f(x) = ak−1x
k−1+· · ·+a1x+s
• For each participant Pi the dealer publishes a corresponding
xi ∈ Zp. The dealer then converts each si = f(xi) into binary.
And thus, each si can be viewed as a column vector of length
l = log2 p+ 1
• As was the case in the (n, n) scheme, the dealer distributes
the si over an open channel by sending each Pi the words
w1i, · · · , wli over the alphabet X± such that wji is trivial in
Gi if sji = 1 and non-trivial if sji = 0.
• The participants reconstruct their own si as in the (n, n)
scheme and can recover the secret using polynomial interpo-
lation.
A major advantage of the scheme over the classical ones is that the
initial private relators are distributed by the dealer, the dealer can
continue using them to distribute more secrets. This is as opposed
to Blakley’s or Shamir’s scheme where new shares need to be sent
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out for each successive secret.
In that vein, the scheme is vulnerable to an adversary determin-
ing the relators by potentially seeing patterns in words they learn
are trivial. Namely, after a participant reveals their share (pos-
sibly while recovering the secret) an adversary could potentially
determine which of the wji were trivial and possibly determine the
group presentation of Gi which would allow them to construct Pi’s
share on their own. In the following sections, we will discuss this
weakness, and see that there are adjustments that can be made
where it isn’t a security concern.
Another advantage to this scheme is that since it is based on the
Shamir secret sharing protocol it can benefit from the large amount
of research done on Shamir’s scheme. For instance, the verification
methods or proactive secret sharing protocols from [61] and [32]
can still be used in this scheme.
3.6.3 Small Cancellation Groups
In this section we introduce the candidate platform group from
[30] for the above secret sharing scheme.
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Definition 3.6.1. A word w is cyclically reduced if it is reduced
in all of its cyclic permutations.
Note that this only occurs if the word is freely reduced, it has no
subwords of the form x−1i xi or xix
−1
i , and the first and last letters
are not inverses of each other.
Definition 3.6.2. A set of words R is called symmetrized if each
word is cyclically reduced and the entire set and their inverses are
closed under cyclic permutation.
If R is viewed as a set of relators, symmetrizing R does not
change the resulting group as the closure R under cyclic permuta-
tions and inverses is a subset of the normal closure.
Definition 3.6.3. Given a set R we say that v is a piece if it is
a maximal initial subword of two different words, namely if there
exist w1, w2 ∈ R such that w1 = vr1 and w2 = vr2. A group
G = 〈X|R〉 satisfies the small cancellation condition C ′(λ) for
0 < λ < 1 if for all r ∈ R such that r = vw where v is a piece,
then |v| < λ|r|.
Small cancellation groups satisfying C ′(16) have linear time al-
gorithm for the word problem [17] making them an ideal candidate
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for the HKS secret sharing scheme. Moreover, it can be seen from
their definition that if the number of generators and the length
of the relators are large compared to the number of relators, it
is likely that there will be small cancellation since the probability
that any two words have a large maximal initial segment is low.
After generating a random set of relators satisfying the above prop-
erties, it is also fast to symmetrize the set and then find the pieces
and check that they are no larger than one sixth of the word. As
such, it is fast to create such groups by repeatedly randomly gen-
erating relators, symmetrizing, and checking to see if they satisfy
the C ′(16) condition. There are other groups that have an efficient
word problem that could also function as candidate groups, but
small cancellation groups have the advantage of being efficient to
generate randomly.
3.6.4 Secret Sharing and the Shortlex Ordering
In this section we present an adjustment to the HKS secret sharing
scheme using the shortlex ordering on a group. This is original
work from [15]. Let X = {x1, · · · , xn} and G = 〈X〉. A shortlex
ordering on G is induced by an order on X±1 as follows. Given
reduced w = xi1 · · · xip and l = xj1 · · ·xjk with w 6= l then w < l if
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and only if:
• |w| < |l|
• or if p = k and xia < xja where a = minα{xiα 6= xjα}
For example, let X = {x, y} and give X± the ordering x < x−1 <
y < y−1. Then some of the first words in order would be: e < x <
x−1 < y < y−1 < x2 < xy < xy−1 < x−2 < x−1y < x−1y−1 < yx <
yx−1 < y2 < y−1x < y−1x−1 < y−2 < x3 < x2y < x2y−1 < xyx <
xyx−1 < · · · This method of counting group elements can be
used to combine group theory with the numerical aspects present
in many other cryptographic schemes. For instance, the shortlex
ordering can be used to modify the secret sharing scheme above:
• In this case, the dealer publishes the letters X and over a
private channel sends a set of words, Ri in X
±1 to each Pi
such that Gi = 〈X|Ri〉 is a group with an efficient algorithm
to reduce words to some normal form with respect to the Ri.
• The dealer chooses a secret s ∈ Zp for some large prime p > n
and generates a random polynomial, f in Zp[x] with constant
term s.
• The dealer assigns a public xi ∈ Zp to each participant, com-
putes f(xi), and finds si ∈ F (X) such that si is the f(xi)th
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word in F (X).
• The dealer publishes a word wi that reduces to si in Gi. This
can be done efficiently by interspersing conjugated products
of relators between the letters of si.
• Each participant Pi computes their share by reducing wi to
get si and then computing its position in F (X).
• Using their shares they find the secret using polynomial in-
terpolation.
The main advantage of this new method is that participants need
only reduce one word rather than a number of words corresponding
to the length of the secret. This also prevents more information
being released pertaining to private relators. Reducing words is
more general than being able to solve the word problem in a finitely
presented group and in some cases may be more complex.
It is important to note the following about this scheme:
• Given an algorithm that reduces words, each wi must reduce
uniquely to si. This implies that if our reduction algorithm
does not terminate at si, then it is not a viable share for this
scheme. In that case, if a random f(xi) does not correspond
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to a fully reduced word, the dealer can always assign Pi a
different xi. It may also be necessary to check that each wi
reduces to si give the reduction algorithm before the shares
are distributed.
• Some reduction algorithms can be done in multiple ways given
the same initial conditions, so it is important to fix a protocol
so that whatever process Pi uses to reduce wi terminates at
si.
3.6.5 Platform Group
For this variant of the HKS secret sharing scheme, we also propose
C ′(16) groups as described in Section 3.6.3. Additionally, we pro-
pose the parameters |X| = 40, |R| = 4, and |r| = 9 for all r ∈ R.
We find that with such parameters, generating a single C ′(16) group
can be done in roughly 1 second in GAP [26] by generating ran-
dom relators of the given length and then checking that the set
of relators satisfies the small cancellation condition. In order to
reduce the wi to si, participants can use Dehn’s algorithm which
terminates in linear time [17]. It is not guaranteed in general that
Dehn’s algorithm will reduce each wi to si, as such it is necessary
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to check that each wi reduces to si. In order to test the efficacy
of Dehn’s algorithm in C ′(16) groups for the purposes of this secret
sharing scheme, we performed the following tests in GAP [26]:
• Generated 10 small cancellation groups using the parameters
from the first paragraph of this section.
• In each group we generated 100 words of length less than 10
and created corresponding large unreduced words of length
500 by inserting conjugated products of relators between let-
ters in our original word.
• Applied an implementation of Dehn’s algorithm due to Chris
Staecker [62] and checked that our unreduced word success-
fully reduced to the original word.
After running said tests, we found that Dehn’s algorithm success-
fully reduced every word. The size considerations in the second
item were given in part because there are enough non-trivial, Dehn
reduced, words of length 10 or less in the free group on 40 gen-
erators to be used as shares in a practical setting. If we let B10
denote the set of non-trivial words of F40 of length 10 or less, we
have that:
|B10| = 80(799 + · · · 79 + 1) ≈ 1.23× 1017.
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Note that among those words only a small fraction are not Dehn
reduced. In this vein, when the size of the generating set is large,
the lengths of the si can be small while the corresponding f(xi)
are large.
3.6.6 Efficiency
Each step in modified HKS scheme can be done efficiently. As men-
tioned previously, generating C ′(16) groups can be done quickly by
repeatedly generating sets of relators and checking to see if they
satisfy the necessary small cancellation condition. The necessary
computations using the shortlex ordering can be done using basic
combinatorial formulas that are very fast for a computer to eval-
uate. Additionally, the wi can be created efficiently from the si
by inserting conjugated products of relators and then reduced in
polynomial time using Dehn’s algorithm. Hence each additional
step to the standard Shamir’s scheme can be done efficiently. This
is also an improvement over the standard HKS scheme since the
amount of words that need to be reduced is independent of the




The main security concern for this protocol is the possibility of
an adversary discovering a participant’s set of relators. As more
secrets are shared and it is revealed which words in a participant’s
group are trivial, it may eventually be clear what the relators are.
As such to optimize security it may be useful to have a secure
method of updating relators. In this section, we present such a
method.
To update relators we add steps that can take place before any
new secret is sent out:
• For each Pi the dealer creates a set of words, R′i, in X±1 such
that Gi = 〈X|R′i〉 satisfies the same desired properties.
• In order to distribute each r ∈ R′i, the dealer pads r with
relators in Ri as done previously and publishes them.
• Pi then reduces r by using the relators in Ri.
• After the full set of words in R′i is published and reduced, Pi
deletes the original Ri and sets Ri := R
′
i.
If these steps are performed before an adversary can figure out a
set of relators, then the protocol remains secure over a long period
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of time since information about previous relators becomes useless.
Note the words in R′i must be reduced with respect to the original
Ri so that Pi can effectively form a new group. In this way Ri
and R′i are not completely unrelated, but as the relators become
updated each additional time, they will have less and less to do
with the original set of relators.
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